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Abstract 
The uprisings of the Arab spring have highlighted the weakness of traditional 
opposition actors which have been unable to predict and lead the revolutions. This 
paper, focusing on the case of Morocco, examines how the discourses and practices of 
the regime shaped the complex field of Political Islam, contributing to towo distinct 
but interlinked phenomena. On the one hand, they have managed to lead Islamists and 
seculars to overcome many of their previous divisions to sustain common battles in 
the name of democracy and human rights. On the other they have deepened rifts and 
divisions among Islamists themselves on the crucial issue of political reforms. 
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Introduction  
 While it is too early to provide an assessment of the reasons that led to the 
2011 Arab spring or to postulate how the different uprisings are going to conclude, 
there are already a number of interesting elements that emerge from current events 
(El-Din Haseeb, 2011). Among them, is the very notable absence in the 
demonstrations at the helm of the uprising of traditional opposition parties and 
mainstream civil society movements, including the Islamists. This is rather surprising 
if one considersing the existence of a variety of opposition movements in most 
countries of the region. This is true also in the case of Morocco where the ‘February 
20th’ movement at the origin of the current anti-regime demonstrations is also not 
affiliated to any specific opposition movement. While the absence of a clear political 
and ideological characterisation of the different uprisings is in the short-term 
beneficial to the potential success of the movements heading such uprisingsthem, it 
might constitute in the long-term a problem in so far as the success of processes of 
democratisation, based on past experiences, seems to be dependent on the existence of 
strong political parties or social movements transformed into parties. This calls 
therefore for an examination of opposition dynamics pre-uprising in order to explain 
why they seem to play a rather limited role in the current situation. This article 
focuses specifically on the multiple facets of political Islam in Morocco and argues 
that an explanation for the weakness of organised and structured social and political 
movements is due not only to the traditional differences between seculars and 
Islamists, but also to fundamental disagreements among Islamists as well. In addition, 
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the articles argues that the case of Morocco demonstrates quite clearly how the 
discourses and practices of authoritarian regimes matter significantly in shaping 
opposition strategies and have unintended consequences beyond their attempts at 
authoritarian upgrading (Heydemann, 2007).     
 
Opposition politics in the Arab world 
The literature on opposition movements in the Arab world has focused traditionally 
on the role that they perform in challenging the incumbent regimes. As Albrecht 
(2010: 3) argues ‘opposition and contentious collective activism has almost 
exclusively been addressed by looking at the potential overthrow of incumbent 
regimes.’ Recently however, more refined analyses of opposition politics in the Arab 
world have emerged. These studies examine the way in which opposition parties and 
movements become, willingly or unwillingly, pillars of the authoritarian regime that 
they so resent. Despite the constant threat of repression, iIt has been argued further 
that Arab regimes are able to manage vast sectors of the opposition more through 
direct co-optation than repression (Albrecht, 2005). The acceptance of many within 
the opposition camp to be co-opted stems from belief that they might in some way 
influence the politics of the regime or from the material benefits they might derive in 
becoming a ‘loyal’ opponent. More significantly however, co-optation is at times the 
direct outcome of divisions within the opposition itself (Cavatorta and Elananza, 
2008). Opposition movements in the Arab world tend to subscribe to radically 
opposed ideologies and views of what policies the country should follow. These 
profound divisions undermine the unity of the opposition, which is a crucial asset if 
ruling elites are to be faced down convincingly. In the Arab world, the main dividing 
line over the last four decades has been the one between Islamists and secular-leftists 
and while there have been numerous examples of cross-ideological co-operation 
between these two sectors and a convergence towards a shared definition of 
democratic accountability (Abderahman, 2009: Clark, 2010), mutual suspicions still 
remain and make successful and lasting co-operation difficult. The debate about the 
role of the En-Nahda party in Tunisia in the construction of a post-Ben Ali political 
system is for instance highly contested in spite of the party’s pro-democratic 
declarations and its participation to coalition-building with secular parties while in 
exile (Martinez-Fuentes, 2011). Thus, when co-operation occurred, this was often ad 
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hoc and limited in time and space, failing to generate a sustained and effective 
coalition against authoritarian rulers (ClarkCavatorta and Durac, 200610).  
 In Morocco this was also the case. During the 1990s and early 2000s political 
Islam and secular leftist groups found it extremely difficult to find common ground 
due to their profound ideological differences. However, the paper argues that, 
paradoxically, the rhetoric of democracy, accountability, human rights and 
development that the regime adopted so openly since the arrival of Mohammad VI in 
power has been instrumental in creating the possibility for both sectors of the 
opposition to move beyond ideology and confront each other on concrete political 
issues. This has led to two phenomena. On the one hand, sectors of political Islam 
entered a dialogue and cooperation with secular-leftists due to a convergence of 
interests and opinions. On the other, there has been a deepening of already existing 
divisions within both the Islamist and secular/leftist camps, indicating that a neat 
separation between the two might not be a useful analytical tool to interpret 
opposition politics in Morocco, as it has become clear that the divisions are the 
product of the acceptance or refusal of the rules of the game dictated by the monarchy 
rather than absolute ideological positions. In this game whose rules are set by the 
Monarch, the sacralisation of the public space is a crucial element (Tozy, 1999). 
Although the July 2011 Constitution no longer refers to the Monarch as sacred, the 
religious legitimacy of the Monarchy is still a crucial aspect of its overall legitimacy 
to rule and opposition parties have to accept such legitimacy of they want to be able to 
openly participate to the political game. This has profound repercussions for political 
movements wishing to remove the central policy-making role of the Monarchy by 
denying it a religious sacred legitimacy. This means that opposition politics and 
therefore the discourse linked to it are better understood by looking at whether 
Islamist or secular groups are included in the official and accepted political sphere or 
outside of it, which depends on accepting the religious pre-eminence of the 
Monarchy, a concept that is potentially highly problematic for both religious and 
secular parties. .  
Since the early 1990s, the Moroccan monarchy has accompanied the 
sacralisation of the political and public space with a discourse based on the values of 
democracy and modernity, including notions of liberal human rights and sustainable 
economic development. In this respectAccording to most observers (Amar, 2009: 
Vermeren, 2009) the Moroccan regime might have adopted a strategy of ‘upgrading 
Formatted: Indent: First line:  1.27 cm
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authoritarianism’ (Heydemann, 2007) in introducing such notions in its official 
discourse. While this is certainly true, the very introduction of such concept that has 
had had unintended consequences. By introducing a rhetoric and practice of 
globalisation that rested on the Adopting a mainstream and internationally-accepted 
notion of globalisation that rests on the values of human rights, democracy and 
development in order to ‘divide and conquer’ the opposition and to bolster its 
international standing, the Monarchy unwittingly opened the door to a re-composition 
of the political field where old divisions disappeared making a dialogue between 
Islamists and leftists possible. All many of the actors of Moroccan Islamism seized on 
this opportunity to advance their causes and objectives, linking up at times with leftist 
elements and therefore re-shaping the way in which opposition politics works in 
Morocco. This was made possible because the nominally global values of human 
rights, democracy and development have been contaminated with local experiences 
and understandings, allowing different political movements to use them against the 
incumbent (Browers, 2006). This has led to a new set of cooperative efforts between 
Islamists and leftists, although it has also created  new The downside of this linking-
up however is that the rifts between the two camps are deepening, allowingthat still 
allow the Moroccan Monarch to  still dictate politics even in face of mounting 
protests. It is in this vacuum that affects the opposition that both violent radicalism 
and youth-driven social movements not connected with parties become the 
protagonists of Moroccan political life. 
 
 
The Moroccan liberal space 
On October 1st 2010, the TelQuel media group formally announced at a press 
conference that the Arabic language weekly Nichane, which had become the best 
selling weekly magazine in the country, would cease its publication. Nichane was 
formally closed because it lacked the financial resources to continue operating, but in 
reality the magazine was a victim of a concerted campaign of financial boycott on the 
part of the state and business interests close to the regime, which refused to continue 
to place adverts in the publication. This occurred because Nichane had become too 
independent and critical of many of the policies that the government and the 
Monarchy were pursuing. As the press release of the TelQuel group indicates, ‘since 
2009, the determined struggle of the State against independent newspapers and 
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magazines has accelerated significantly…the Moroccan authorities seem to be bent on 
following the Tunisian model [under Ben Ali], where only the newspapers that serve 
the interests of the regime are tolerated.’2 The closure of Nichane and the repression 
of independent journalism are simply one of the latest episodes in the authoritarian 
retrenchment that Morocco is experiencing since the middle of the 2000s. While some 
would contend that the new Constitution approved by referendum in July 2011 is a 
potent signal that Morocco is still on course for democratization, a degree of 
scepticism is necessary in so far as the central role of the Monarch in shaping and 
dictating policies has not been undermined (Dalmasso and Cavatorta, 2011) with both 
repression and co-optation simply taking on new forms. In many ways this 
authoritarian retrenchment is in sharp contradiction with the enthusiasm and genuine 
hope for political change that had greeted the arrival of Mohammed VI to power in 
1999 and with the liberalising policies that he implemented, including ones that ‘made 
Morocco a regional exception in terms of freedom of the press’ (Interview with 
Ahmed Benchemsi, editor at the time of Tel Quel magazine, 2010).  
During the first few years in power Mohammed VI showed with concrete 
actions and policies his intention to seemingly democratise the country and instil a 
‘human rights’ culture in state’s institutions. His father had understood in the early 
1990s that Morocco needed liberalising political reforms and he had begun to 
undertake some of them, including the creation of a Human Rights Ministry, but most 
Moroccans and many analysts simply believed these changes to be a façade and 
placed much greater hope in the son. They were not to be disappointed and, as one 
former political prisoner and human rights activist declared in 2005 ‘society is now 
allowed to breathe’ (Interview with author, 2005). The change in emphasis in favour 
of both democracy and human rights was not only rhetorical, as Mohammed VI took 
meaningful steps to support his declarations. He fired the powerful Minister of 
Interior Driss Basri, encouraged the creation of a reconciliation commission to 
investigate past abuses, the first one of its kind in the Muslim world, and passed 
legislation aimed at making it easier for civil society organisations to be set up and be 
involved in policy-making processes. The enthusiasm that these initiatives generated 
should not be underestimated and they gave a certain momentum to all those political 
and civil activists who had suffered during Hassan II’s repressive era, mobilising 
                                                 
2 Groupe TelQuel, Communiqué de presse, Casablanca, October 1, 2010.  
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previously hidden and new energies within society. Thus, under Mohammed VI there 
has been what Howe (2005) termed ‘an explosion’ in civil society activism, including 
organisations promoting and defending human rights. Such organisations were 
involved in the setting up of the Instance Equité et Réconciliation (IER), which 
bought a significant amount of legitimacy to the King both domestically and 
internationally as did the 2004 reform of the family code. Such initiatives were 
coupled with the implementation of policies aimed at rendering the electoral process 
and the state’s institutions more democratic. The 2002 legislative elections were in 
this respect a turning point in Morocco, as they did not display the same level of 
‘interference’ from the authorities as previous consultations did. In addition, there 
seemed to be the genuine intention to involve Parliament more significantly in policy-
making rather than relying exclusively on the executive, which is appointed by the 
King (Denoeux and Desfosses, 2007).   
While a small number of activists always doubted Mohammad VI’s 
liberalising intentions, the majority of them bought into the vision that they were 
contributing to build democracy in Morocco in the context of a western-inspired 
globalisation structured precisely around the values of democracy and human rights 
they could easily be reconciled with. The changes that Mohammed VI introduced are 
not the product of globalisation and were not generated from the outside, but were 
made possible because there was a framework that the Monarch could utilise to 
placate both domestic and external critics. The notions and selective meaning of 
democracy and human rights that were acceptable to the international community 
were used in the Moroccan context in order to allow the new Monarch the space to 
navigate the system and renew the legitimacy of the throne. In this context, 
Mohammed VI did not introduce anything innovative in so far as he follows on the 
tentative gradualist approach to selective democratisation that his father had 
inaugurated, but what changes with the new global democratic zeitgeist is that forms 
of protest and dissent that were always in existence ion Morocco and used to be 
repressed are now legitimate because the Monarchy refers to them as a legitimising 
tool for its new course. This new course is however meant to co-opt previously 
repressed actors rather than fundamentally reconfiguring power. During Hassan II’s 
reign those political and social actors that demanded democracy, justice and respect 
for human rights were countered by the Monarchy by using notions of tradition and 
cultural specificity, resorting basically to use Islamism against the broad left. Once the 
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legitimising discourse changes and favour precisely notions of democracy and human 
rights, Islamists are also largely forced to follow suit although they appropriate these 
values differently.  
The rhetoric and actions emanating from the Palace seemed in fact to 
substantiate the support that the King enjoyed in political circles previously hostile to 
the Monarchy because of its authoritarian rule such as the leadership of the Socialist 
party, the Marxist left and sectors of political Islam. Thus, there was the legitimate 
expectation that the reforms would continue and that Mohammad VI would be the one 
enabling the Moroccan transition to democracy by gradually modifying the role of the 
Monarchy from an executive to a simply representative one. On May 16 2003 
however the history of Morocco took a different course. Fourteen suicide bombers, 
belonging to a local radical Islamist group called al-Salafyia al-Jihadia, attacked 
targets in central Casablanca, signalling the end of the Moroccan exception. Until 
then, Moroccan ruling elites prided themselves of being exceptional within the Arab 
world in so far as the country was not concerned with terrorism The attacks shattered 
the belief that Morocco was immune to regional trends.  
The response of the regime was particularly strong and a new spiral of human 
rights abuses began, targeting specifically manifestations of  political Islam. Initially, 
large sectors of the human rights community were not overly concerned with such 
abuses as other reforms beneficial to ‘human rights’ in general were being 
implemented, but the repressive turn soon extended from Islamists to other social 
actors such as Diplomés Chômeurs3 or independent magazines and newspapers. In 
addition to this, no meaningful democratisation of the political system took place. For 
instance, the 2007 legislative elections were far from being the historic event that the 
regime enthused about with foreign diplomats, as ordinary Moroccans simply did not 
bother turning out (Storm, 2008).  and, iIf anything, the Monarch hass been able to 
reasserted his central and undisputed authority on Moroccan politics and the 
Constitutional reforms of 2011 have not changed this. , avoiding any constitutional 
reform that would limit his executive powers. The 2007 legislative elections were far 
from being the historic event that the regime enthused about with foreign diplomats 
                                                 
3 Diplomés Chômeurs literally means ‘Unemployed Graduates’ and is a collection of different groups 
of students with university degrees who are unable to find suitable employment despite their 
qualifications and organise protests against the government to highlight their plight and the poor 
economic policies adopted. Diplomés Chômeurs activities, such as marches or sit-ins, are very often 
broken up by the police with violence. For more on this issue see Badimon Emperador (2007).   
 9 
and ordinary Moroccans simply did not bother turning out (Storm, 2008). Thus, after 
over ten years in power, it emerges that, according to numerous scholars and 
observers of Morocco, Mohammed VI’s reign has been largely disappointing in terms 
of democratisation and the promotion of human rights (Amar, 2009; Vermeren, 2009). 
What is more worrying from a normative point of view is that the regime seems to 
have become more authoritarian and intolerant of dissent during the past few years, 
effectively ending any hope that Morocco would be the first country in the Arab 
world to move from authoritarianism towards democracy. Mohammed VI promised in 
March 2011 that the recommendations on how to democratise the system of a newly 
appointed Constitutional Commission would be implemented, but the appointees are 
largely members of the Makhzen and loyal to the king, leadings sceptics to argue that 
this is another delaying tactic in the face of mounting street protests. 
The way in which King Mohammed VI handled the transfer of power from his 
father to him and the subsequent policies he adopted are now understood through the 
notion of ‘upgrading Arab authoritarianism’ (Heydemann, 2007). While there is 
probably some truth in this analysis, this should not overshadow two significant 
points. First of all, this reading is applied after the fact and this inevitably 
underestimates the way in which society and the political system were genuinely 
opened up by Mohammad VI (El-Ghissassi, 2006). The framework of upgraded 
authoritarianism is indeed a very useful one to account for the survival of Arab 
leaders in power, but it might wrongly assume that this strategy was intentional from 
the beginning and entirely successful. Secondly, today’s Morocco is not the Morocco 
of the ‘years of lead.’ This does not mean that it is not authoritarian and that there are 
no echoes of past practices as the disappearance of Salafist prisoners at the hands of 
the security forces demonstrates (Human Rights Watch, 2010), but there is 
nevertheless a liberal space that exists and within which a number of political 
movements and civil society actors operate.  
Democracy, human rights and economic development through integration with 
the global economy constituted the rhetorical framework that the Monarchy utilised to 
implement political, social and economic reforms since the late 1990s and this links 
Moroccan domestic developments to global trends. Even in these current times of 
authoritarian retrenchment Tthe rhetoric of democracy and human rights has far from 
disappeared in the public Moroccan discourse and in fact constitutes the point of 
reference of the Monarchy, which argues that repressive measures are necessary to 
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protect the achievements of the past decade in the face of hostile and anti-democratic 
forces. As Mohammad VI pointed out in the speech which with he launched the IER, 
there is a connection between adhering to a human rights doctrine and fighting 
terrorism. He explicitly argued that ‘this [was] the way to consolidate positive 
citizenship and to promote democracy, patriotism and the dissemination of a culture 
of human rights and duties. [These values] are the strongest ramparts to protect our 
society from extremism and terrorism, which We are determined to fight with the 
firmness required of those who are in charge of protecting the stability and security 
[of the country] in the context of the rule of law.’4    
This liberal environment, however limited it might be, has mobilised the 
different ‘souls’ of Islamism, which have responded in different ways to the changes 
in the Kingdom and reacted differently to both the rhetoric and daily practice of 
democracy, human rights and economic development as conceived of by the 
Monarchy. It is therefore important to analyse  the way in which these religious actors 
have dealt with the new political arrangements in place and how they have at times 
appropriated and at times fought against the rhetoric and the political values that the 
King through the new international pro-democracy context ‘globalisation’ brought to 
Morocco, building on their own understanding and experience of such notions.  
 
Political Islam in Morocco 
Contrary to what scholars such as Munson (1991) argued in the early 1990s, 
Islamism in Morocco has become a political force to be reckoned with, indicating that 
the Kingdom, despite the religious legitimacy of the Monarchy, did not constitute an 
exception in the region. In a 2003 article reviewing the different expressions of 
political Islam in Morocco, Laskier argued that there were three clusters of Islamism 
in the country and to a certain extent his analysis is still valid today, although new 
Islamist actors have also appeared on the scene since then.  
First of all, there is a legally recognised political formation, the Party for 
Justice and Development (PJD), which is a socially conservative party integrated 
since 1996 into the political and institutional system devised by the Monarchy. The 
party is indeed allowed to participate to institutional politics precisely because it 
                                                 
4 Mohammad VI, Discours prononcé par SM le Roi à l’occasion de l’installation de l’Instance Equité 
et Réconciliation, January 7, 2004. Text available at http://www.maroc.ma/NR/exeres/B272623A-
227C-46D3-AC67-557BE9DCDF7A  
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accepts the limits imposed by the Monarchy on the political game and therefore the 
PJD explicitly recognises the primacy of the Monarchy in the country’s institutional 
and constitutional set-up. The PJD, despite never having entered a government’s 
coalition, is deemed to be integrated into the liberalised autocratic system because of 
its unwillingness to criticise the monarch and bow to the Makhzen’s pressure when 
necessary. The acceptance of the sacred nature of the Monarch was the precondition 
for being able to operate openly in the political system and the PJD can be certainly 
considered loyal opposition (Zeghal, 2005). For instance, upon request by the 
authorities, the party decided not to run candidates in all constituencies at the 2002 
legislative elections precisely to avoid sweeping the board and embarrassing the King 
with a significant Islamist electoral victory (Willis, 2004). As recently as February the 
Spring of 2011, the PJD refused to support the protest movements sweeping across 
Morocco precisely because they believe that constitutional reform should not be 
demanded in the streets but should be the product of parties’ lobbying and should be 
formally initiated by the Monarch. This attitude has triggered the resignation from the 
party of three prominent members supportive of the demonstrators.5 In short, the PJD 
is very much part of what can be labelled the ‘loyal opposition’ in so far as it remains 
deferent to the monarchy and to its executive primacy. The Monarch recently 
announced that there will be constitutional reforms and that the new provisions will 
limit the executive role of the King, although the repression of demonstrators 
continues.  
Second, there is the very popular semi-legal Justice and Charity Association 
(al-Adl) founded by the long time dissident Sheikh Abd al-Salam Yassine. This 
association operates like a social movement providing services and assistance to the 
poorer sections of society and is preoccupied with Islamising society from below by 
promoting a sort of Sufi-infused utopianism (Kristianasen, 2007). The social service it 
provides however have a considerable political dimension and the association also has 
a ‘cercle politique’ that functions like a political bureau. The cercle is charged with 
drawing up the political positions of the association on a number of national issues 
and has been consistently critical of the way Morocco is run and therefore directly 
critical of the Monarchy, whose legitimacy to rule it does not accept. This anti-
                                                 
5 For the details of the PJD’s position on recent demonstrations and internal repercussions, see the 
magazine Aujourd’hui le Maroc at www.aujourdhui.ma/instantanes-depeche81050.html Accessed on 
March, 10, 2011.    
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monarchical stance prevents the association from gaining not only the legal 
permission to operate social services, but, crucially, prevents them from becoming a 
political party. In fact, in order to be able to compete in elections the association 
would have to accept the limits, role and legitimacy of the Monarchy, which is a price 
that the association refuses to pay because it would then undermine their status as 
uncompromising opposition. Sheikh Yassine himself has been and still is a very 
outspoken critic of the Crown, which is blamed for not tackling the social and 
economic ills of Moroccan society (poverty, corruption of moral values, deference to 
the West, social atomisation). Islam is pointed out as the solution to all these 
difficulties and the social services, the cultural meetings and the political activities of 
the association are all infused with religious piety in order to demonstrate that there is 
a concrete alternative not only to the way in which Moroccan society operates, but 
also a spiritual dimension with which governance should be infused. This does not 
make the association a naïve and purely spiritual group or a mad lunatic fringe as 
often depicted in pro-regime media. Over time its leaders have been capable to of 
demonstrating their political acumen on a number of issues by adopting very rational 
positions (Cavatorta, 2007). As prominent member Nadia Yassine argued ‘we have a 
cercle politique that draws up concrete policy proposals, [which means] that we are 
not only mad naysayers …we have concrete proposals [for the country]’ (Interview 
with author, 2008).  
The third Islamist camp is composed of two different Salafi tendencies. One 
the one hand there is the clandestine Salafist Jihad, a nebulous group devoted to 
overthrowing the government through violence. It is a minority strand and does not 
enjoy much popular support, but was responsible for the May 2003 Casablanca 
attacks. The movement Salafist Jihad has virtually disappeared due to the mass arrests 
that it experienced over the last few years. The security forces’ crackdown on Islamist 
terrorism and the marginalisation of Salafist Jihad by all other political groups 
combined to dismantle its network. Most of the militants are in jail and the only 
activities currently taking placevisible in the public space connected with the 
movement are the ones that the association Ennasir holds in order to highlight the 
plight of the prisoners and their families. Most of these prisoners have been arrested 
and tried in very controversial circumstances and Ennasir attempts to highlight how 
the Salafi prisoners’ convictions have been unlawfully obtained by state, which 
employed kangaroo courts and torture. In addition, Ennasir struggles to defend the 
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rights of the families of the prisoners as spouses and children suffer from harassment 
and discrimination on the part of the authorities in a number of realms ranging from 
the schooling of children to welfare benefits. The association Ennasir, founded in 
November 2004 ,with the objective of defending the prisoners’ rights and the rights of 
their families, is a self-defined human rights organisation. On the other hand, we have 
also the return on the scene of Dawa Salafism, which ‘concentrates on Islamising its 
followers and isolating them from the political process rather than directly 
challenging the state’ (Boubekeur, 2008). While this phenomenon seems to be 
growing considerably in Algeria, it does not seem to have become as popular yet in 
Morocco, although there is a history of it in the country. Today, the best know 
representative of this type of Islamism is theologian Sheikh Maghraoui, whose 
religious association promotes a very strict and literal interpretation of Islam. The 
Sheikh has come under severe criticism in recent years for his position on the issue of 
under-age marriage and in a 2008 fatwa he stated that ‘the marriage of nine-year-old 
girls is not forbidden because according to the Hadith (the Prophet Mohammed's 
sayings), Mohammed married Aisha when she was only seven-years-old and he 
consummated his union when she was nine.’6 These declarations have political 
undertones in so far as they seem to indicate that political and social relations should 
be based on immutable interpretations of sacred texts and sayings, but it they are 
strictly non-political in the sense that followers are encouraged to isolate themselves 
from official and institutional politics. In any case they have provoked a backlash 
against the association and the Sheikh with the authorities intervening to shut down 
some of their activities, although the Sheikh himself has a considerable power base in 
Marrakech and has been left alone by the authorities who have allowed him to leave 
for Saudi Arabia.7  
Finally, there exists a cluster of Islamism connected to and supportive of the 
Monarchy, which is often marginalised in studies of Moroccan politics, but that 
nevertheless is an important actor in the legitimisation of current political 
arrangements. There are for instance brotherhoods and associations such as the sufi 
Zaouiya Boutchichia, which has an important role in Morocco because it functions as 
the connection between sectors of the pious middle-class and the monarchy. The 
                                                 
6 See statement at http://www.middle-east-online.com/ENGLISH/?id=27880 Accessed on October 22, 
2010. 
7 More on Dawa Salafism in Morocco see http://www.lobservateur.info/Maroc/enfance-salafiste-les-
brigands-de-linnocence.php Accessed on March 11, 2011.  
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movement is very much aligned with the monarchy on political and social matters, 
which means that it can be mobilised to compete with opposition Islamism.  
Thus, the field of Islamism in Morocco is both varied and complex with 
competing trends and approaches to politics and social engagement, which depend on 
the religious beliefs held and on the political outlooks of leaders and members. Given 
the variegated field of Islamism in Morocco, the introduction of the values of 
mainstream globalisation incarnated by the notions of democracy, human rights, and 
economic liberal development has had a different impact on the actors of Islamism, 
which have taken these values and re-interpreted to suit their specific agenda. What is 
interesting to note is that in the process of engaging with such mainstream values, all 
these movements attempt to give them a ‘halal rubber stamp’ to make them 
compatible with their religious and political beliefs. This has led to different types of 
concrete relations with other actors on the political and social scene that do not 
subscribe to religious values as guides for policy-making and activism. In the next 
section we analyse these relations.  
 
Between religious ideology and pragmatism  
 Haynes (2010: 149) recently argued that ‘despite the undoubted impact of 
western-dominated globalisation…the impact on the MENA in terms of changing the 
context, terms of debate and preferences in favour of liberal-democracy is relatively 
limited.’ This argument carries a degree of validity in so far as the values of liberal-
democracy might not yet be as widespread as one would expect, but it is also 
important to note that not all the MENA countries are the same and in the case of 
Morocco, some religious actors have appropriated the discourse and practice of 
Western-dominated globalisation to turn it in fact to their advantage and at times 
against its very proponents both domestic and international. It is this discursive and 
practical appropriation filtered through local traditions and modes of understanding  
that we investigate to illustrate how religious actors in Morocco operate. In turn, these 
different understandings of what democracy, human rights and development are 
produce significant divergences between the different souls of political Islam and this 
has consequences for the way in which coalition-building among nominally 
opposition groups takes place.   
 There is little doubt that one of the core-values of liberal western-dominated 
globalisation is the respect of individual human rights. While in the past Islamist 
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movements, much like other religiously inspired actors in Christianity or Judaism, 
countered this discourse by rejecting the very notion of individual rights to focus on 
the notion of the common good which implied that some individual rights could be 
sacrificed to obtain it (Fuller, 2004), this is no longer the case today for some Islamist 
actors. The position of the association Ennasir linked to the Salafi Jihadi movement is 
for instance oneprovides an example of a group that would not normally be associated 
with the promotion and defense of individual rights. However, it is precisely this 
Islamist association that has for the past few years been at the forefront of the struggle 
for human rights in Morocco when it comes to the right to a fair trial, the right not to 
be discriminated because of specific political beliefs and the right of being treated 
respectfully while in custody. While the association is certainly not representative of 
the broader Salafi trend and has been set up with a very specific and narrow mission, 
it is still important to highlight that its The struggle they conduct rests on a classic 
liberal interpretation of human rights and has benefited, paradoxically, from the 
rhetorical engagement of the Moroccan authorities on this very theme. The Monarchy 
and the Moroccan state have built its current reputation on the willingness to break 
with past abusive practices and the necessity to have proper rule of law and respect 
human rights. Despite, the authoritarian retrenchment in evidence since late 2003, the 
rhetoric, as mentioned earlier in the paper, has not changed. This stance exposes the 
Moroccan authorities to the charge of hypocrisy given the way in which the rights of 
the members of Salafyyia Jihadia and the families of the members have been treated 
and the association Ennasir utilises the very same rhetoric to point at the 
inconsistency of the regime discourse. This does not mean that members of Ennasir 
uncritically accept the notion of individual human rights as a gift from the West that 
they are grateful for. There is an elaboration of such a concept taking place in light of 
the indigenous experiences, both practical and discursive, which is used to frame the 
demands they make, but, crucially, the resonance of the notion of human rights is 
much grarter and carries more influence both at home and abroad. A further twist is 
that the response that the cause of Ennasir has elicited from other human rights 
associations and from fellow Islamists. This has meant that large scale human rights 
abuses committed against Islamists, however unpalatable their political views might 
be, did not find unanimous condemnation in traditional human rights circles because, 
again, the elaboration of such notions depends on the wider ideological framework 
that different movements and even individuals might have. Quite the contrary in fact 
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occurred, asRather than being welcomed in the human rights camp, Ennasir activists 
found that the doors to traditional left-wing dominated human rights groups were 
closed to them when they raised the issue of the Salafi prisoners. As Abderrahim 
Mouhtad, president of Ennasir, admitted, ‘before taking the decision of founding 
Ennasir, we knocked on all the doors of NGOs involved in human rights issues here 
in Morocco so that they might wish to take up the Salafi prisoners’ issue. Truly, I 
want to confirm that these NGOs did not want [to help] us’ (Interview with author, 
2008). Islamists prisoners are no longer shy about telling their stories of abuse at the 
hands of the state publicly, as Storm (2009: 112) argues. She states that ‘radical 
Islamists often have unfair trials, and are ill-treated while in prison, something that is 
becoming increasingly apparent as more and more Islamists begin to tell their stories 
of torture and abuse, not only to their families, but now also to human-rights 
organizations and the media.’ Their plight is therefore quite public, which makes the 
decision not to help out all the more puzzling.   
Thus, the decision of many human rights NGOs in Morocco not to defend the 
rights of the Salafi Jihadi prisoners occurred irrespective of the often private 
acknowledgment that many of the ones who had been unjustly arrested, tortured, tried 
and sentenced in unfair proceedings were not guilty of any violent act, but were being 
punished for their political ideas. For example the president of Forum Marocain 
Verité et Justice, an organisation that in the past had seen the coming together of both 
Islamist and leftist activists in defence of human rights , recently declared that ‘the 
[human rights] violations committed after 1999 are not as serious [as the ones 
committed before then]’ (Le Journal, January 2010). While this might be numerically 
correct in the sense that the Salafi prisoners who suffered and still suffer in jails are 
between 2,000 and 5,000, the scale should be irrelevant when it comes to abuses. 
However, this declaration sums up the view of many within secular civil society 
regarding the human rights regime that the Monarchy has put in place: human rights 
do not necessarily apply to problematic Islamists. There is however one important 
exception to this trend., Tthe secular-leftist Association Marocaine des Droits 
Humains (AMDH) has from the beginning beening very critical of the regime’s 
treatment of the Salafi prisoners and of the abuses to which they were subjected to. 
Such an engagement with this issue dates back to at least 2005 when members of the 
families of Islamist prisoners were allowed to tell their story during the AMDH series 
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of open forums entitled ‘Temoignages en toute liberté pour la vérité.’8 As the 
president of association Khadija Ryadi declared ‘given that international conventions 
are our framework of reference [for our activism], our positions, discourse and 
demands are always in line with those conventions. This applies to every issue, be it 
the rights of women or the rights of Islamists. We defend everybody, all those who 
are victims of violence and abuse on the part of the regime’ (Interview with author, 
2009). This is quite an important point because it indicates that one of the key values 
of liberal globalisation, no matter what the specific elaboration of it, has become the 
glue of movements that are normally on opposing ideological sides. Naturally, it 
could be argued that the belief in a liberal notion of human rights on the part of 
Ennasir is simply instrumental, but while this might be the case, it should be 
disregarded as irrelevant because once a movement begins to express support for 
specific ideas it is then bound to them to certain extent (Schwedler, 2006). The 
position of Ennasir is striking also because the other Islamist groups, including the 
Party for Justice and Development and Yassine’s al-Adl movement, prefer to remain 
almost entirely silent on the issue of Salafi prisoners. Their virtual silence can be 
explained by the ideological and political threat that Salafism poses to both 
movements and by the fear of increased repression against them if they do get 
involved.  
The al-Adl, while critical of the monarchy, does not support the use of 
violence as a means to achieve political change in Morocco because this is not only 
religiously proscribed, but ultimately self-defeating politically as the masses have to 
be brought to be participants of change rather than simply having change imposed on 
them through a violent overthrow of the present regime (Nadia Yassine, interview 
with author, 2008). The PJD is integrated into the political system designed by the 
Monarch and it therefore has to tow the line on this very sensitive issue as well. Thus, 
the Casablanca bombings had the effect of crystallising a fragmentation of civil 
society that still today prevents the creation of a unanimous front on what human 
rights actually are and how they should be promoted or defended. The upshot is the 
absence of a serious challenge to the interpretation and implementation of human 
rights policies that the Makhzen has now the monopoly on. This particular 
relationship between movements of different ideological hues is not the only one that 
                                                 
8 See www.amdh.org.ma/html/act_pub.asp   Accessed on March 11, 2011.   
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has drawn on the western-inspired globalisation surrounding the notion of human 
rights as understood in the liberal tradition. The discursive and practical applications 
of the different religious groups regarding the nature of human rights run along 
multiple and variable lines. In this context it is worth examining for instance how 
socio-economic rights  has entered the Moroccan political scene. In the face of the 
aggressive economic liberalisation that the Monarchy implemented over the course of 
the last decade to integrate the country into the global economy according to neo-
liberal principles (Cohen and Jaidi, 2006), some religious actors have turned to the 
language of socio-economic rights to criticise such policies and the devastating social 
outcomes they have had. The position of the al-Adl is in this respect quite strong, as 
the association provides a thorough critique of the neo-liberalism and its effects in 
Morocco not by resorting to trite anti-imperialist sloganeering, but by focusing on the 
absence of respect of the most basic socio-economic rights of ordinary Moroccans, 
which, according to the al-Adl undermines the quest for democracy. In this context, 
the dramatic socio-economic data ranging from youth unemployment to rates of 
literacy and from GDP per capita the number of Moroccans emigrating, that the cercle 
politique employs in its critique are not simply equated with failed economic policies, 
but, crucially, are seen as the concrete denials of democratic rights9. Thus, in many 
respects, socio-economic rights have primacy over political and civil ones because 
only when there is just economic development and a fairer distribution of resources 
there can be democracy. This debate is very similar to the one carried out in many 
other developing nations and even in developed ones, whereby  gGlobalisation is not 
identified as being negative per se because the negative effects it has are the product 
of the greed and mismanagement of nationalthe economic elites and rulersthe 
Monarchy. They are the ones who are held responsible for the poor state of the nation. 
In the Moroccan case, and the al-Adl’s 2007 document concludes that ‘it is the 
Makhzen that has become the real obstacle to democracy and development.’  
Accordingly, the al Adl is very engaged in supporting all forms of struggles 
that take place in Moroccan workplaces where workers strive for better pay and 
conditions and to end exploitation. It is therefore obvious that they support the current 
anti-regime demonstrations. This emphasis on socio-economic rights is in line with 
the thinking and the activities of some secular leftist groups and this has generated a 
                                                 
9 See the Lettre ouverte à toute conscience resposnable, publsihed in December 2007 by the cercle 
politique of the al-Adl. Available at www.hoggar.org  
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degree of cooperation and coordination with them. The political formation with which 
the al-Adl is most closely cooperating with Annaji Addimouqrati (AD), a leftist group 
that is very engaged in alter-globalisation initiatives and in anti-regime political 
activities. This leftist group shares the same analysis of the ills of Morocco with the 
leadership of the al-Adl it is also considers the negation of socio-economic rights as 
the most significant obstacle to democracy because it conceives of democratic 
governance not merely as procedures and mechanisms of elections, but, crucially, as 
the necessary condition for the distribution of wealth. Thus, democracy has a 
considerable substantive dimension. At the operational level, this analytical 
coincidence with the al-Adl leads the two movements to support all sorts of 
demonstrations, strikes and struggles that have an economic dimension and are 
therefore active in providing material and political support to workers in different 
industries that strive to better their conditions, to the unemployed and to people living 
in slums who demand better living standards. One of the leaders of AD, Ali Afkir, 
pointed to a specific example of cooperation with the al-Adl: ‘[we both] support the 
struggle of factory workers in a factory for the treatment of phosphates to have their 
independent union recognised’ (Interview with author, 2010).  
There is also a political and institutional dimension to this cooperation 
between the two. At the ideological level, the AD is committed to a type of political 
pluralism that includes the right of all movements to be heard on the public stage, 
including the Islamists of the al-Adl, even if they ‘have profound disagreements with 
them on the issue of personal freedoms. Ali Afkir declared that ‘as long as the debate 
is conducted democratically and with respect, all have the right to express their 
political point of views’ (Interview with author, 2010). The same degree of tolerance 
of difference characterises the discourse of Omar Iharchane, member of the cercle 
politique of the al-Adl, who argued that ‘[the al-Adl] is ready to discuss with every 
other political force in Morocco. Obviously we are aware of the fact that some 
political movements perceive us badly and are afraid of us, but the fears are mutual 
and this is why debating with everyone is important’ (interview with author, 2010). 
The two movements have indeed taken their cooperation beyond declarations of 
mutual tolerance and beyond concrete support for workers into the institutional arena, 
having run candidates on the same list for elections in the professional association of 
the engineers. 
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At the institutional level, the regime has also made much of the notion of 
democracy and democratisation to frame the politics of Mohammad VI. On this issue 
as well, Islamists have applied different perspectives and subscribe to opposing 
readings. The PJD perceives itself as ‘building democracy’ through participation in 
institutional politics, running candidates for Parliament and attempting to influence 
policy-making from within the system. In this respect they cooperate with established 
political parties that have been loyal to the monarchy since their creation and behave 
as ‘responsible’ members of the establishment. Institutional participation in Morocco 
depends on the acceptance of the predominant role of the Monarchy and its legitimacy 
to shape policy and the PJD, as a religious party, accepts this because the monarch is 
legitimated to rule by the fact that he is the descendent of the Prophet. There is 
therefore a religious justification for their participation in addition to the practical one 
that they prefer to be inside institutions and trying to affect change rather than being 
outside and being unable to see any of their most preferred policies implemented. In 
this respect they behave much like the Socialist party (USFP), a one time foe of the 
Monarchy and now fully co-opted in the political system.  
Contrary to the PJD, the other clusters of Islamism refuse participation 
because they see it as selling-out to a monarch that has no intention of creating a 
genuine democracy where elected representatives rule and the King is simply a figure-
head. This is the position of the al-Adl for instance as well as Ennasir with both 
movements very critical of the notion of democracy used by the Monarchy and the 
parties involved in the political structures that the King has attempted to revitalise. In 
this respect a crucial demand of those outside the official political system is a 
thorough reform of the Constitution that would significantly reduce or eliminate the 
executive powers of the Monarch, but even the constitutional changes of 2011 failed 
to deliver on this. Even when the monarch announced in March 2011 that such reform 
would indeed take place, movements on the extra-parliamentary left and the al-Adl 
are critical and suspicious because they do not believe that the King will follow 
through as this is what the Monarchy has always done in the past at times of 
difficulty. The announcement is therefore interpreted as a tactic to buy time in the 
face of mounting social dissatisfaction. Criticising the Monarchy however is not what 
the PJD does. In fact the party prefers to see some of its policies implemented by 
relying on the Monarchy itself and therefore it ‘lobbies’ it on specific policies because 
the party is aware that only the King can make things happen. While this strengthens 
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the party due to the objectives it achieves, there is no doubt that such a strategy 
reinforces the authoritarian and arbitrary nature of monarchical rule, as the PJD 
competes with other parties for royal favours. As mentioned, it is not surprising that in 
the current revolutionary climate in North Africa, the PJD has steadily refused to 
encourage its members to participate to the demonstrations regularly taking place in 
Morocco since the early February 2011 while both the al-Adl and other leftist forces 
not represented in parliament support the demonstrations and have militants 
participating in them.      
  
Conclusion 
The complexity of political Islam in Morocco and the different ways in which 
it appropriates and ‘contaminates’ the language and values of globalisation introduced 
by the Monarchy to remake the legitimising foundations of its rule demonstrate that 
religious actors can and do adapt to new circumstances and are far from relying 
simply on anachronistic stances. Furthermore, the divergences that exist between 
Islamist groups has an impact oninfluence potential coalition building among 
opposition groups with the old divide between seculars and Islamists no longer as 
valid to interpret politics in Morocco. and possibly across the Arab world. A number 
of points emerge from this analysis. First of all, ‘religious’ ideology does not seem to 
be very important when it comes to interacting with movements of a secular 
persuasion. In fact, quite the contrary is true. Islamists movements, which should have 
core ideological points in common, find it easier to strike alliances with non-Islamist 
groups and associations rather than within the same Islamist camp. This indicates the 
significant tensions that exist within political Islam in Morocco, illustrating the 
impossibility of treating Islamism as a unified actor. This does not mean that religious 
precepts are irrelevant because Islamist movements in Morocco rely on different 
scholars and ideologues to justify their position and all of them have specific religious 
references (Zeghal, 2006) that are at times in sharp conflict with each other, but it is 
the political situation and the concrete objectives that movements wish to achieve that 
shape to a considerable extent the manner in which they operate. This leads to a 
second significant point. All Islamist movements seem to find credible and committed 
partners in secular movements to which, in theory, they should be distant from. In The 
case of Morocco, this is not the case, confirming once again confirms  that other 
factors other than supposed ideological distance explain the nature of cross-
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ideological relationships. In Morocco, it is the relationship with the Monarchy that 
determines the relationship with other political and social movements because of the 
sacred nature of the Monarchy itself. For Islamist movements, despite their rhetorical 
and at times concrete opposition to secularism in so far as it is believed to destroy the 
fabric of society because of its perceived elimination of spirituality from social and 
political life, secular actors can constitute an important ally in a struggle for an 
enhanced role in Moroccan political life. For instance, during the electoral campaign 
for the new Constitution of July 2011 we can see that the sufi Brotherhood 
Boutchychya was in the pro-Monarchy ‘yes’ camp while the sufi al-Adl was in the 
‘no’ camp. The same division applies to the Salafists, with the ones following 
Maghraoui in the ‘yes’ camp and the ones in Ennasir on the opposite side. 
Conversely, the traditional suspicions that many within the secular left have for 
Islamists are assuaged because there is a degree of convergence on shared objectives. 
Finally, the most interesting finding of this analysis is that the values of western-
inspired globalisation such as human rights, democracy and development are being 
used and appropriated by a range of religious actors to advance their own 
understanding of it based on their own political philosophies and indigenous 
experiences, which is at times in leading at times to contradiction with  their 
mainstream internationally-accepted conceptualisation. This is an effective strategy to 
re-position themselves away from the label of ‘medieval’ and ‘un-modern’ political 
actors and it is a strategy that the Turkish AKP has successfully implemented (Dagi, 
2009). The rhetoric emanating from Islamists movements in Morocco today is 
substantially different from the one they employed in the 1980s and 1990s when 
‘Islam is the solution’ seemed a sufficiently clear slogan for supporters and enemies 
alike to identify the political positions of Islamist groups. While attachment to the 
notions of democracy and human rights might still be instrumental, the daily 
exchanges and relationships they have with secular counterparts suggest a rather 
radical re-think of Islamism on the part of its proponents, which have taken advantage 
of the limited liberal space in Morocco to offer alternative visions of society based on 
universal values.      
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